Report 12
CHAPTER 1
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS- A
MISCELLANY
1.1 Airforce Bombing in Murunkan
and the Real Targets in Jaffna.
1.2
How the Battle for Jaffna Lagoon was Lost
1.2.1
Jaffna Lagoon: The Massacre of 29th July & the Continuing Tragi-Comedy
1.2.2
The LTTE and the Jaffna Lagoon
1.3
LTTE Politics and the Tamil Nation : One Party, Seven Nations
1.4.2 Mannar: The Disappearances of 4th July 1993.
1.5
Recruitment for the Sri Lankan Army
1.6
Incident at Nochimoddai Sentry Point, Vavuniya : 31-9-93:
1.7 The LTTE's Volunteer Force - The Mahaveli Regiment
The international public has become too used to being
told by defence spokesmen in Sri Lanka that aerial bombing in Jaffna is undertaken
with pin point accuracy against carefully verified targets. This claim though
in stark contrast to the experience on the ground is now seldom challenged.
The foreign press is not always there. The local press takes only a nominal
interest in foreign affairs-it has long taken separation for granted. Having
destroyed the last vestiges of independent civil society, the LTTE's
very artful and meticulously detailed documentation, counts as mere propaganda.
But the most palpable demonstration of the government's claims came from the
air force itself. An ironic instance of bombing took place about 11th November
1993, when the Jaffna Kachcheri, the main symbol of the government's authority
there, was hit by the air force. This was then passed off as an accident.
Jeevodhayam farm run by the Wesleyan Mission lies on
the right bank where the Aruvi Aru takes a 14O degrees bend in the Murunkan
area. It is managed by an elderly minister who resides with his wife in the
mission house. The spread of the farm itself is larger than Nallur Central,
the area encompassing several major temples which was the capital of the kings
of Jaffna. 3 miles north-east of the farm is a government animal breeding centre,
once occupied by the IPKF and subsequently used for a time by the LTTE.
The LTTE had never used Jevodhayam farm. The airforce on the lookout
for targets in order to stay in business, evidently got its identification mixed
up and commenced bombing Jeevodhayam on 15th June as follows:
15th June
- Sia Machetti trainers dropped 4 bombs and Pukhara jets another 5. All fell
away from the buildings.
14th July
- Sia Machetti trainer aircraft dropped four just missing the nursery and the
hostel.
26th July
- Pukhara jets dropped four, two falling outside the farm and two just missing
the chapel. Bombs fell again at 5 P.M on 29th July with similar results.
The more than 17 bombs dropped made huge holes in the ground and the shock waves
caused damage to roofs. Other significant damage was caused by small bombs,
thrown from the Sia Machettis.
We learn that after each
bombing the JOC was at least verbally told by church spokesman with no apparent
result. The church evidently became helpers assisting the judges in a competition.
The fact that no building was directly hit was judged as a prodigious feat of
bombing by the SLAF. With no prospect of ground fire except the prayers of those
below, no condition for pin-point accuracy was wanting. In Jaffna the bombing
is aimed at houses, supposedly LTTE occupied, amidst closely packed civilian
residences and sometimes adjoining schools in full session. We invite the reader
to judge the official claims and demand at least one thing. Tell the government
not to carry the jest any further. Should they feel an urge to bomb, let them
say plainly that their aim is to kill civilians, although they may accidentally
hit the LTTE, as the latter too has intended.
Killinochchi
: In 8.4 of Report No 11
we raised the airforce bombing of St. Theresa's school in Killinochchi on 12th
February which was then next to an LTTE camp. The children then narrowly
escaped. This school has subsequently been bombed at least once. The first bombing
was raised by foreign correspondents at the weekly cabinet press conference.
These conferences were later discontinued.
About July the school was in session when bombers circled
overhead. The children gathered around a Roman Catholic nun who was in charge
of a class, and squatted on the floor in fear, their heads down. Some held the
nun's feet. The nun who was standing saw a shiny object fly past and thought
that was the end. The bomb lodged itself in the sand 25 yards from the class.But
had failed to explode.
The `Island' of 8th November 1993
carried as its lead story the setting up of a new naval base at Elephant Pass
to launch air-sea operations to curb traffic in the Jaffna Lagoon. This follows
the failure of the army's recent ` Operation Yarldevi' of 28th to 4th October
to halt this traffic. The army commander's claim that the facilities at Kilali
are not being used for the traffic had been widely contradicted in the press.
With the Poonerayn disaster this proved superflous.
The role of the new base, the report added, is to "
launch operations against LTTE and civilian boats crossing the
lagoon, they ( highly placed military officials) said". Quoting these sources
it went on, " In the early hours of last Saturday ( 6th November), the
navy, helicopters and planes swung into action when security forces
radar picked up a boat convoy. Several boats were believed to have been sunk
in the attack".
The language used is evocative of a gallant attack
by intrepid forces against an enemy with aircraft carriers, ground-to-air missiles
and the like. But in reality the targets are mostly helpless civilians crossing
the lagoon in dilapidated fishing boats for the lack of any other option. Moreover,
they were subjects of the very government which was obliged to protect them,
but was instead attacking them. We shall briefly trace how this impossible situation
developed.
In Special Report No.5 we have given details of another
massacre by the navy in the lagoon. In the improving visibility of the morning
twilight, the navy would have had no doubt that the intended victims were civilians
including women and children. The civilians themselves went to great trouble
to identify themselves by audio and visual signs. Not one return shot was fired.
The navy came alongside, boarded one of the boats and had attempted to make
it sink or set it on fire. Even the Geneva conventions accepted by the state
oblige it to treat enemy injured falling into the armed forces' hands as one
of their own. Even if a mistake was made, as was not the case, the navy, once
it came into contact with the victims, was obliged to carry the injured for
expeditious medical care, and treat the care and safety of those injured at
least in keeping with duties to prisoners of war. What transpired instead was
an attempt to annihilate the survivors. There was no doubt that the navy's intention
was to avenge in a perverse and misconceived manner, the army's defeat at Weli-Oya
four days earlier.
Greater importance, as we have always said, should
be given to what the government has been doing to ensure that such incidents
do not occour. The official spokesman has ingenuously kept repeating that the
lagoon is a prohibited zone and who travels therein is liable to being shot.
We have argued before (Report No 10:0),
that the role of curfews, prohibited zones, and intervals of martial law to
meet particular exigencies are never intended to license the forces to transform
themselves into ravening wolves, treating the civilians immeasurably lower than
prisoners of war. The accountability of the forces is ultimately to the people.
The measures above are only meant to meet a perceived threat to those vested
with enforcing the law, in a manner circumscribed by political judgement. Are
the political authorities or the forces conscious of this?
For much of the time since the naval massacre of 2nd
January, the forces seem to have tried to balance the need for civilians to
use the lagoon for the lack of an alternative, with a desire to ensure that
civilians are not used as cover for the LTTE's movements in the lagoon.
Goods and people explicitly destined for Jaffna had been cleared at military
check points in Vavuniya and allowed to pass, knowing that the prohibited lagoon
was the only available route. In the weeks after the 2nd January massacre, the
LTTE promised protected convoys on days kept secret until the 11th hour.
This too in time become more formal than active. Jaffna bound passengers came
to be told by helpful soldiers at Vavuniya, "Go without wasting time,
there will be a boat service tonight"
What happened most of the time was that civilians waiting
to cross would hear noises of heavy firing from about 7.OO to 1O.OO P.M, followed
by silence. The boats would then depart between 1O.OO P.M and mid-night, completing
the journey by 5.OO A.M. Civilian casualties however did continue to occur in
varying circumstances. That the recurrence of what was always dormant took an
extreme form on 29th July is partly a consequence of leaving the forces at a
loose end with the national leadership lacking in either political or military
objectives.
That the LTTE makes money by making the civilians
use the Jaffna lagoon is well known - a hundred rupees or more on each passenger
plus a tax of Rs 5O/- or more for each piece carried. Nor can it sustain civilian
life and its interests in Jaffna if people cannot travel south. Apart from this
the LTTE's assurances of security and concern for the civilians has
a great deal of theatre and shamefully little substance. Even when Sea Tiger
patrolling was given a temporary high profile after the January massacre, people
strongly suspected that their safety would be enhanced by being left alone.
The boatmen are themselves the Tamil counterparts of Sinhalese civilians being
settled by the forces in dangerous areas. They too are people forced by circumstances
to live dangerously for their subsistence. Reports have consistently spoken
of boatmen jumping into the sea at the slightest alarm, leaving the passengers
adrift, and re-emerging when the coast was clear. In an unusual instance the
boatman jumped in upon hearing a gunshot. Two passengers who could swim jumped
in after him. Having the misfortune of not being bald, the boatman was dragged
by his hair back into the boat and forced to steer the boat. When the LTTE
presents disarmingly accurate press reports of naval atrocities, there is usually
a passing comment such as `the boatmen could not be found' or are `yet missing'.
Their conduct was hardly held worthy of blame. There is little doubt that prompt
desertion at the mere sign of danger is a condition agreed to under which they
function. The boats are increasingly unseaworthy and the engines fewer and more
unreliable. For all the money made there seems to be little, if any, regulation,
safety measures or instruction in drills to ensure passenger security. The boats
attacked by the navy on the 29th July set off after 2.3O A.M with faulty engines,
long after mid-night, when the last boats were supposed to leave. The reservations
of passengers were not heeded by the boatmen, on account of perhaps Dutch courage,
extracted from local materials, necessary in such professions. All the details
are reported in the LTTE controlled press with a classic cowboy serial
ending. After the naval predators had long departed leaving dead and injured
in a boat kept afloat by a survivor baling out water, another boat approaches
them. The anxious man looking to his end, hears the reassuring words of the
Sea Tigers, "Fear not, we have come!"
The terror in which passengers are forced to travel
is revealed by another incident in early August. One boat as was customary was
being towed by another in heavy wind and rough sea when the tow rope snapped.
The rudderless boat buffeted in the water, with perhaps the fourteen passengers
crowding onto one side in fear, capsized, drowning many. These tragedies were
mostly avoidable with responsible regulation. There were clearly no ethics in
the game
Why are the people treated so cynically as a depoliticised,
atomised mass? Was it necessary?
The UNHCR had been involved in a long series
of negotiations to reopen the Sangupiddy ferry service and ensure passenger
safety. The army in Sangupiddy had reportedly agreed to conditions on screening
passengers under UNHCR supervision which could not be objected to. A
UNHCR spokesman told a group of NGOs in June that over months of negotiations
a 27 page document had been drawn up which was incapable of further improvement.
He said that he was going to find out for the last time whether there was the
political will to implement it. Significantly, the `political will' was being
sought in Jaffna rather than in Colombo. After it became clear that the LTTE
had turned down the UNHCR proposals, the `Island' gave the document
front page publicity during the second week of September. It claimed, with obviously
mischievous intention, that the government had signed the document. The government
in a move which showed lack of direction and political clarity was quick to
distance itself from the document. Instead of challenging the LTTE on
its indefensible position as regards civilians, between the government and the
`Island', the LTTE was given a reprieve if not a present.
We reliably understand that the LTTE
spokesman Anton Balasingam has made it more or less explicitly known
that they needed civilian cover to operate in the lagoon. The lagoon affair
too,no doubt, gave the Sea Tigers valuable training to sharpen their skills.
1.2.3 The Battle of 25th
August 1993
On this night a trap had been laid for naval patrol
boats from Nagathvanturai that were meant to act against movement in the Jaffna
Lagoon. In a series of manoeuvres during a confrontation, Sea Tigers isolated
naval patrol boat P 115. Black Sea Tigers Mathan and Varathan
were waiting on the fringes of the confrontation in explosive packed boats
`Pulendran' and `Kumarappa'. Mathan summoned by radio crashed
his boat into P115. P123 which came to the aid of P115 was similarly attacked
and sunk by Varathan.
This incident had several implications which were unsettling
to the government. It also perhaps influenced ` Operation Yarl Devi' a month
later - an operation whose results unleashed a spate of controversy.
We recapitulate the sequence to draw the implications.
Despite the fact that the government from about the end of 1991 declared the
lagoon a prohibited zone, the LTTE needed to break the prohibition.It
needed the lagoon to transport men and materials. To this end it was prepared
to use civilians as pawns or as a shield. Given that the civilians had no choice,
a government respecting its obligations towards them had some choices. The Governmernt
was apparently not in a position to extend its territorial control so as to
check the traffic. The other was for it to order the navy to be very circumspect
in dealing with civilian boats and expose politically the LTTE's cynicism.
As the UNHCR affair above shows, the government lacked political courage
to pursue this course.
It was in this context that naval massacres of civilians
took place. On occasions such as 2nd January 1993 (Report No 10), the navy boarded civilian
craft, mutilated and looted. The LTTE promised Sea Tiger protection
to the civilians. This public relations exercise though backed by some action
was far from convincing. The bottom line of what happened was that civilians
continued to be used as bait to draw out the navy, around which Sea Tigers acquired
considerable experience in manoeuvres. During a confrontation on 24th June Sea
Tiger Admiral Charles was killed.
What the incident above of 25th August did, by sharply
curtailing naval movements, was to provide considerable substance to what was
earlier the fiction of Sea Tiger protection of civilian travellers. The introduction
of airpower against civilian movement in the lagoon is an admission that a political
blunder had been compounded by a military set - back. The new government moves
in the press report above which defy sanity had the markings of a battle for
individual egos.
By July 1983 the idea of a single Tamil nation that
received political life in 1956 had become firmly rooted in the minds of the
people. But a politics which replaced dialogue with terror has made the idea
increasingly tenuous.
An ordinary, typical, but very suggestive incident
took place in the Colombo Fort - Trincomalee train. A veteran Tamil leader of
Eastern origin was in conversation with a 5O year old professional from Jaffna.
On the subject of the Jaffna lagoon crossing, the Jaffna professional told then
leader, "The LTTE would not go along with reopening the Sangupiddy
ferry service. They would never allow Tamils to be checked by Sri Lankan forces
on the soil of Tamil Eelam". The leader responded indignantly, "You
are now going to Trincomalee. You will be checked by the police as you alight
and thereafter at every sentry point. It will be the same if you go into Batticaloa,
Vavuniya, Mannar or Kalmunai. What do you mean the LTTE will not allow
Tamils to be checked on the soil of Tamil Eelam? Have you already given up on
us?" The professional, who was among the privileged travelling to Jaffna
by ship rather than through the lagoon, observed a prudent silence.
By destroying collective initiative, using every weakness
to its advantage without reference to principle and thereby forcing people to
think in terms of individual survival, a fracturing of the Tamil identity is
in progress. Although there is no open political activity, in every district
passive alignments are taking place based on local exigencies.
In Trincomalee there is a desperate search for a Tamil
leadership that would address the land question. In Batticaloa, an end to Tamil
militants hunting each other - something the Jaffna leadership of the LTTE
is in no mood to address. Where enlightened military officers have convinced
local Tamil civilians that troops would act in a disciplined manner, the LTTE
has found itself in deep trouble.
In Jaffna there has always been, and still is, a class
among the intelligentsia who would refuse to understand the changing ground
situation around them and the dangerous isolation of Jaffna. But the people,
whose perception is not to be underestimated, know that both sides are using
them. The shared sense of disillusionment among Tamils is reflected in the word
`pahadakkai' (Pawns) to describe their condition.
1.4. Mannar District
1.4.1 Recent Developments
The case of Mannar is one
where poor judgement, lack of consideration for civilians and the absence of
overall political direction, can bring despair where there was hope. The political
stakes in Mannar were high because it was a staging post for refugees being
returned from India. The coming of Brigadier Karunatilleke in January was followed
by an LTTE ambush and an incident at Pesalai UNHCR refugee camp
which boded ill [Chapter 8 of Report No 11]. The brigadier who came
with a bad record on violations gave the LTTE a political trump card
by stopping the boat service to Vidathal Thivu. This 12 mile boat journey was
the only route operating between Mannar Island and the LTTE areas on
the mainland. The brigadier simply declared that the main road across the causeway
into the interior was open, while the LTTE maintained that it was mined
at the frontier. The result was that those going to Madhu had to take the sea
route to Kalpitya and then through Puttalam, Anuradhapura and Vavuniya. The
LTTE let it be known that it would stage ambushes on the island until
the boat service was resumed. On 13th April a few LTTE men infiltrated
the town in the evening, fired at the police sentry and ran away. In keeping
with the brigadier's tough image, the army shelled the town from the main Tallady
camp. A Muslim child was injured. A Tamil boy whose vein was cut by shrapnel
bled to death because he could not be taken to hospital under those conditions.
Another ambush on the 4th July where 5 policemen were
killed was followed by passenger buses being stopped and the girls, especially,
beaten.and the disappearence of three young men. A lack of communication between
the police and the army resulted from the police resenting bunker duties and
patrolling which they regarded as the army's job. The brigadier's style did
not evidently contribute to the effectiveness of the forces.
Prior to the incident of 4th July a police sub-inspector
returning after taking an injured colleague to Thallady was attacked on the
causeway killing the SI and several constables in the vehicle. A member of the
hospital staff in the ambulance ahead sustained injuries. The brigadier expressed
surprise and indignation upon finding that no sentry point on the entire causeway
connecting Mannar Town with Thallady main camp was manned during the nights,
whereas he had thought that these were manned by the police - an odd position
for someone in charge of security for the whole district. During a subsequent
confrontation at the railway bridge in late July, 3 soldiers and 3 LTTE
men were killed.
Throughout this period a confrontation had been brewing
between the brigadier and the Roman Catholic Church - though other officers
with a bad record on violations like Major Dias, the former town commandant,
were smart enough to maintain outwardly cordial relations with the local elite.
Matters came to a head in July when the brigadier disallowed a resumption of
the Vidathal Thivu boat service for the festival of `Our Lady of Madhu'.
The following month the brigadier was replaced. The new brigadier, Patrick
Fernando, allowed the boat service to function for the August festival.
The LTTE's displeasure with Brigadier Karunatilleke did not stem
from any concern for the people. One area where the brigadier was effective
was in largely stemming smuggling operations to the north where sections of
the forces, traders and Tamil militant groups are widely spoken of as having
had a stake.
The Weli Oya debacle of late July was followed by a
precipitate withdrawal of the army from areas which it had held for more than
seven months to new lines encompassing Thallady and Vankalai near the coast.
Several refugee families who had resumed life in army occupied areas found themselves
stranded. They had begun cultivation and had sold their milk and vegetables
on the island where there was a big demand. Among those arrested by the LTTE
following the army withdrawal were six civilians in Suriyakaddaikkadu. To many
refugees the army has been discredited as a body to be depended on. They see
the army as having pulled back without sparing one thought for them.
It is a clear demonstration of how an ill-conceived
and untenable ideological project like Weli Oya can demoralise and confuse objectives.
The new brigadier arrived at a time most ill-suited for his initiation. For
a man in overall charge of security, administration and rehabilitation, people
found him lacking in self-assurance and almost saying that he did not know what
was going to happen. He was clearly the victim of either a policy vacuum or
of policies which changed every few months.
At 1O.OO A.M on this day a police party was ambushed
at Tharakkulam 5 miles out of Mannar town on the Talai-Mannar road.Five poicemen
including an SI were killed. Apparently unaware of this incident, about mid-day,
people were returning by bus to Pesalai. At the BMC (Building Materials Corporation)
police check point on the edge of town, the police detained several people including
school children. The three adults taken in were:
Illayathamby Chitralingam
(32) of Trincomalee, Wife: Rajasuloshana(29), Children: four, ages 11 to 4 years,
two in Trincomalee.
Arumugam Arasaratnam (31)
of Kumburupiddy, Trincomalee District, Wife: Pushparani (28), Children: boy(8)
and a girl-born and died after father's disappearance.
Arulanatham Amirthanayagam
(28) of Kuddiyiruppu, Mannar District, unmarried living with two sisters, rest
of the family in India.
The first two were living
in the UNHCR ORC (Open Relief Centre) at Pesalai. They were both picked
up on 16th November 199O in an army round up and were released on 8th August
1992, after being held at Thallady and Kalutura. The third who was in the government
run Welfare Centre Refugee Camp, also in Pesalai, was released from detention
in May 1993. We have dealt with similar cases in chapter 2 of Report
No 10. It is also clear from their circumstances that they were not
actively involved in any militant activity.
They all had to report monthly to the police in Mannar
- the puropse for which they had come to Mannar town that day.
Following the abduction of civilians by the police
on 4-7-1993 above, the ICRC came on the scene and the children were released.
As transport came to a standstill people went back to town to stay over with
friends or relatives. But no curfew as was declared.
What is puzzling is how the three men taken in by the
police got missed out. According to local sources, the people there saw the
police getting the three out of view upon seeing the ICRC coming. The
local ICRC man in charge was described as dedicated and aware of the
local situation. Moreover, the third person was accomapnied by one of his sisters.
Normally she would have done all she could to have the matter acted upon, either
directly or with help. Did the ICRC speak to the people? Or did they
speak and the people too scared to give information?
The expatriate UNHCR officer in Pesalai too
was stuck in Mannar town until the following day. According to our information
it was the follwing morning that the ICRC and UNHCR raised the
matter with the brigadier's office in Thallady army camp. The arrests were simply
denied and the detainess are now among the disappeared. If some relative wishes
to file a habeas corpus application, it cannot be done in Mannar. It will have
to be done in Colombo and the applicant would of necessity have to keep out
of Mannar. This is likely to be impossible given the expenses and local family
commitments. That is the state of the people.
Something has gone inexplicably wrong and we do not
have answers to the questions raised. One may put down a few points which may
offer some understanding.
1.There was a general expectation that disappearances
had largely ceased. For instance the ICRC in Batticaloa was then said
to be pursuing only arrests of more than 24 hours durartion.
2. A general ignorance about the role of, and services
provided by the ICRC. The is disputed.
3. The public mind being generally dominated by a mixture
of fear and apathy. Mannar has been lacking in leadership and an active citzens'
committee tradition such as is found in Batticaloa. People talk very cynically
about the local social hierarchy and accuse the administration of rampant corruption,
but are afraid of knowing too much.
It has also been said that the OIC of the BMC police
post, having gone to the scene of the earlier ambush, was not present when the
arrests took place and that the lower ranks were then doing their own thing.
Still many questions about the role of the forces remain unanswered. Did the
detainees also suffer their fate when the OIC was not present? Even after it
was perhaps too late to save lives there was no talk of an inquiry or disciplinary
action -only the proverbial denial.
All this goes to show that the existing machinery,
both state(eg the HRTF) and NGO, to combat disappearances, leave alone
torture and abuse, is nowhere near acceptable. Accountability, in final analysis,
is no better than what it was at the worst of times.
The `Sunday Island'
of 22nd August announced that there had been a lowering of requirements for
recruitment. Age down from 18 to 17. Height from 5ft 4in to 5ft. Educational
qualifications from grade 8 to grade 5. Of the 21 centres designated for walk-in
interviews, the first were to be held in Trincomalee, Vavuniya and Amparai on
23rd August. Interestingly, these three centres would take in recruits from
the controversial colony areas of the North-East, rife with social and poverty
related problems.
The exercise also has a sinister ring. The new requirements
remind us of how the country is teeming with stunted and undernourished children
who are also school drop-outs. Perhaps under pressure from the international
community, the army later modified its position about the age of recruitment.
Given the instinctive hawkishness of the
new president, the visible component of the defence budget may soon reach 25%
of the national budget or 5O% of national income - thus sowing the seeds for
more conflict and more deprived children for the army. According to a peasant
leader from Uva, the remains of about a hundred soldiers who died during the
recent battle at Pooneryn are being brought to the region for internment. The
final death toll among the forces at Pooneryn is said to exceed 6OO. The peasant
leader said, "In recent times the army recruited a large number of youths
from around Uva, including Hambantota, Moneragala, Buttala, Bibile, Badulla,
Bandarawela and Haputale. An important reason for this is the dropping of the
educational requirement to standard 5, considering the fact that these are neglected
areas with a high dropout rate in schools. Even earlier the army was not paying
much attention to certificates. A letter from the local MP was enough.
"Even in places where there was agricultural
work paid at Rs 1OO/= per day, a son going into the army and sending home Rs
4OOO/= a month appeared an attractive proposition. That seemed a quick way to
recognition and social upliftment. I also know people with strong Buddhist sensibilities
who have told their sons, `Son, stay at home. You may earn less, but we can
see you in the morning and in the evening and feel comforted. If you go into
the army we may never see you again. Moreover son, we do not want money you
would earn for killing others.'
"Another factor governing recruitment is the
one sided presentation of the army by the state media and the mainline press.
Although the alternative press has made a powerful impact among the educated
in Colombo, almost nothing of it is seen in my area. So when our boys go into
the army and see the other side at first hand, they become quickly disillusioned.
That is why desertion of soldiers from these areas is also high."
The number of raw recruits killed or missing at Pooneryn
is said to be nearly 3OO. The tragedy in these areas raises questions about
whether any political party in parliamnet really represents their down to earth
interests. The current public discourse about military disasters seems to have
taken some lessons from the LTTE's book. For both the government and
the opposition raising questions about political and military competence in
relation to the war, such as may rock the boat, has become taboo. Young men
whose lives are being thrown away as a result are commemorated as heroes and
even martyrs. Thus any deeper examination of the tragedy is obviated.
But the common people faced with a mounting toll of
dead and maimed have their doubts and the response to recent recruiting exercises
has been poor. Nevertheless, to carry on blundering the army badly needs cannon
fodder. Given the compliant mood of the opposition, observers believe that conscription
may not be far away, provided it is designed to provide loopholes for the children
of those who matter.
In the morning as soon
as travel was permitted a group of persons coming into Vavuniya from the North
were seen approaching the Sri Lankan sentry point at Nochimoddai which was manned
by the PLOTE. Instead of coming in the usual manner the persons came
in file as though being prompted by someone. On reaching the sentry point these
persons were queuing up. A PLOTE sentry reportedly observed a weapon
sticking out of the bag of one of the travellers. He immediately shouted a warning
and an order to fire was given. During the sequel about 6 civilians and another
5 who were presumed to be LTTE men were killed. 12 injured civilians
received treatment at Anuradhapura hospital. Also killed were 3 members of the
PLOTE and one soldier. It is believed a person who was near the head
of the queue was carrying a bomb in a bag which exploded on being hit by a bullet
when the PLOTE opened fire. The 3 PLOTE men and a soldier died
in the explosion. The plan it seems was for the bomb to be thrown inside the
bunker, following which the other LTTE persons were to remove their gun
from their bag and open fire. Travellers who came that way the following day,
found between the LTTE and the army check points blood clots and an abandoned
ladies slipper. There were also some school books in a plastic carrier bag.
Evidently the civilians had not initially known that they had been infiltrated
by persons planning to carry out an attack.
The LTTE's journal `The Liberation Tigers' of
August 1993 carried a feature about its Volunteer Force. It was formed at the
beginning of 199O, it said, reached the second stage of its development in mid
- 1991 when the volunteers were trained to use .3O3 rifles, and is now said
to have reached the third stage.
The context and idea behind its origins came out of
the eviction of Tamils from the Manal Aru ( Weli Oya) region and the institution
of Sinhalese settlement under Mahaveli System L.The report went on : "
Town and village folk in Mullaitivu (District)were evicted in the course of
military operations. For 3 years (since the beginning of war) the government
gave no consideration to their plight. On the contrary, in the Manal Aru region,
the peoples' houses, schools, community and medical centres have been destroyed
by bombing. The volunteer Force was begun to save people from the government's
atrocities and enable them to live with freedom". The Ministry of Lands
and Mahaveli Development has thus much to do with the birth of the force.
The journal made the extra-ordinary claim, "
All the villagers in the Manal Aru region have joined the Volunteer Force."
Counting able bodied men affected by
System L, the claim, if true, would place the strength of the Volunteer Force
in the Mullaitivu area at well over 5, OOO. [See our Special Report No. 5 - " From
Manal Aru to Weli Oya"].
The claim, which sounds like hyperbole, may be technically
true. A common response from educated, semi- urbanised and westernised Jaffna
youth to political disillusionment and endless conflict is to flee abroad. But
in areas like Mannar, Vavuniya and Mullaitivu of the rural North, decisions
tend to have a collective and community based character. If the LTTE
had pointed to the unconscionable nature of the Weli Oya colonisation and had
demanded that everyone should sign up for the force and undergo training, the
demand would have had considerable legitimacy. Despite reservations, a more
- or- less collective decision to join up sounds plausible.
On the other hand when the LTTE puts the same
demands to people in the Vavuniya and Mannar areas, the response has been seen
to be lukewarm or tending towards hostility. ( See 3.2.2 & 3.2.4).[Top]
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